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    <title>Applocker on Aperture Zone</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Applocker on Aperture Zone</description>
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      <title>GPO — Block PowerShell and CMD for non-admins</title>
      <link>https://aperturezone.com/gpo/block-console/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
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      <description>&lt;h2 id=&#34;the-problem&#34;&gt;The Problem&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A standard user has no legitimate reason to open a PowerShell console or a command prompt. Allowing them access is like leaving a door open: an attacker who gains a user session can use PowerShell as a tool for reconnaissance, lateral movement, or execution. Closing this backdoor reduces the attack surface.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Let’s be clear about the scope: &lt;strong&gt;this GPO does not protect against ransomware&lt;/strong&gt;. A modern crypto-locker includes its own execution engine and does not rely on &lt;code&gt;powershell.exe&lt;/code&gt; or &lt;code&gt;cmd.exe&lt;/code&gt; present on the machine. Blocking the console is a hardening measure (reducing the attack surface, defense-in-depth), not a bulwark against malware. True ransomware protection involves removing local admin rights, comprehensive application whitelisting, and offline backups.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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